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rrigation is critical to food security and economic growth in contemporary India.
The performance of irrigation systems is of serious concern to farmers who rely on
them for their crops and livelihoods and to governments that have invested heavily
in their development. The most severe problems facing Indian irrigation systems are
the increasing costs of new schemes, the huge backlog of incomplete schemes, and the
increasing neglect of existing systems. Large-scale canal irrigation systems, in particular,
are in poor condition: they are not properly maintained, operations are inadequate, water
supplies do not reach the end of systems, and the timing of water supply is unreliable. The
wide gap between actual and desirable performance threatens the sustainability of irrigated
agriculture. How did this state of affairs come to pass?
THE NEED FOR REFORM
A
s irrigation systems have expanded, their upkeep has become more expensive. Fiscal
crises have made the subsidies required to sustain system operations and maintenance
(O&M) unaffordable. Investment needs in other sectors have challenged the priority
accorded to irrigation financing. The heart of the problem, however, lies in the institu-
tional structure for irrigation management and the incentives for agencies and farmers.
Accordingly, in examining the nature and scope of the problems of large-scale surface
irrigation in India, the authors of Institutional Reforms in Indian Irrigation focus on
options for institutional reform and the outcomes of several pilot reform programs. They
use qualitative and quantitative techniques to examine actual experience with irrigation
reforms in India. They focus on two water-scarce states, Rajasthan and Karnataka, and
two major irrigation projects within them to examine the existing irrigation situation,
financing issues, and reform outcomes. The authors also examine comparative data on the
factors affecting water users’associations and collective action in irrigation from 48 sites.
The authors conclude that institutional reforms must address the incentives of water
suppliers and users and lead to new arrangements for joint management of irrigation.
Reforms should be based on six principles: (1) the irrigation agency must be financially
autonomous; (2) irrigation staff salaries must come from the fees charged for irrigation
water; (3) the irrigation agency must be accountable to user groups; (4) third-party inter-
vention in the form of an Independent Regulatory Commission for Canal Irrigation
(IRCCI) may be necessary to prevent a deadlock between the irrigation agency and farmers
when it comes to costs and incentives; (5) the primary tasks of the IRCCI should be to
ensure transparency in contracts, obtain technical help, and act as a dispute settlement
body; and (6) the pricing of water should be related to consumption to keep costs low.
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
Agencies
Financially autonomous irrigation agencies, or nigams, are needed for efficient irrigation
supply. Several states have initiated institutional reforms by setting up nigams. Empirical
analysis of the performance of the nigam in Karnataka indicates that although it raised
capital resources (through domestic bonds) and reduced the gestation lag that plagues
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physical sustainability as well as per-
formance have not improved.
This outcome relates to the struc-
ture and ethos of the existing nigam.
In setting up the organization, little
attention was paid to long-term per-
formance of the system, full financial
autonomy was not in place, irrigation
rates did not cover O&M expenses,
staff had no long-term identification
with the organization, the nigam did
not provide accountability to user
groups, and farmers opposed the
increase in fees because they had not
been consulted. Nonetheless, the
nigam approach has merit if imple-
mented with proper objectives and
structural changes, especially in ongo-
ing irrigation projects.
Farmers
Reforms to the irrigation agencies alone
are not likely to improve system per-
formance. Joint management between
government agencies and water users 
is required. With local knowledge
unburdened by bureaucratic regula-
tions, users’ organizations can be more
efficient in carrying out critical O&M
tasks. But for these participatory irriga-
tion management (PIM) strategies to
work, sufficient incentives must be in
place for farmers to take an active role.
Several factors increase the like-
lihood that farmers will undertake 
collective maintenance and lobbying
related to O&M. Farmers are more
likely to carry out organized activities
at sites where a canal serves one vil-
lage, where temples or religious cen-
ters are situated, where larger com-
mand areas are close to markets,
where traditional leaders or college
graduates live, and where community
organizers provide initial leadership




IM programs hold considerable
scope for improving system man-
agement, but they vary in scope and
structure, thus differing in incentives
and costs to farmers. Previous PIM
policies focused on registering formal
organizations with set responsibilities
that focused on issues of concern to
government. But organizations are 
not ends in themselves—farmers do
much collective maintenance and lob-
bying without formal organizations.
PIM policies, therefore, must address
the concerns of users to ensure that
farmers have sufficient incentives to
participate.
First, legal changes must occur to
empower user groups. If PIM pro-
grams are to make a major difference,
user organizations need the authority
to levy water fees, carry out mainte-
nance tasks, and represent farmers’
interests with government agencies.
Without this authority, user groups
will not be taken seriously by mem-
bers or other organizations.
Second, clarifying and strength-
ening the water rights of user groups
may provide one of the strongest
incentives for farmers to participate in
irrigation O&M. Currently, the gov-
ernment claims ownership of water in
public canals. But if farmers pay an
increasing share of the costs of the
system, they become investors and
should gain stronger rights.
Finally, the state will continue 
to provide critical services, espe-
cially water supply at main delivery
points. But clear agreements should
exist about who is responsible for
maintenance activities. Maintenance
activities that farmers perform are 
the most direct means by which PIM
programs contribute to better irri-
gation system performance. Where
farmers are involved in maintenance
activities, the resources mobilized
are significant—sometimes several
times greater than the irrigation
charges paid to the state.
These reforms are a move toward
a new relationship between govern-
ment agencies and farmers. Finan-
cially autonomous irrigation agen-
cies, in which the staff depend on
fees from farmers for their salaries,
can make farmers into clients. If
farmers pay for capital costs through
levies, they should become share-
holders in the system. And if farm-
ers’ organizations take on an increas-
ing role in O&M, they should be seen
as co-managers.
More than just structural changes
are necessary to achieve adequate
reform and improve the performance
and long-term sustainability of irriga-
tion systems. Changes in attitudes are
also required in how government agen-
cies view farmers and how farmers
depend on the government. Effective
partnerships require clear expectations,
communication, and respect between
parties. It is in the interests of farmers,
irrigation agencies, and the society in
general for India’s canal systems to
operate more effectively in the new
millennium.
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